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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Peremptory Challenges in Criminal
Cases: A Comparison of Regulation in
the United States, England, and
Canada
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Peremptory Challenges: Eliminated or Regulated?
In Batson v. Kentucky,1 United States Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall urged that only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely could racial discrimination in the jury selection
process be eliminated.2 Before Batson and since, numerous com-
mentators have written on the use of peremptory challenges in jury
selection. Some praise this process,3 while others, like Justice Mar-
shall, call for its elimination.4
Those who would retain the peremptory challenge expound on
its merits. First, peremptory challenges can immediately correct a
trial judge's erroneous decision to refuse to grant a challenge for
cause, thus saving appellate courts' time and permitting the trial
judge greater latitude in accepting a juror's assertion of impartial-
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
3. See, e.g., James J. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge-An Obituary, 1989 CriM.
L. REv. 528; Charles J. Morton, Jr., Peremptory Challenges: Are Their Days Numbered?,
MD. B.J., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 32; Michael A. Cressler, Comment, Powers v. Ohio: The
Death Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28 IDAHo L. REv. 349 (1991-92).
4. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abol-
ished, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 369 (1992); Gerald A. Bunting & Lesley A. Reardon, Once More
into the Breach: The Peremptory Challenge After Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 7
ST. JoHN's J. LEoAL COMMENT. 329 (1991); Paul Murray, Holland v. Illinois and Powers v.
Ohio: The Discriminatory Effect of the Peremptory Challenge Evaluated from the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 13 CRIM. JusT. J. 335 (1992); Jeff Rosen, Jurymandering: A Case
Against Peremptory Challenges; Cover Story, NEw REPUBmC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15; Marvin
B. Steinberg, The Case for Eliminating Peremptory Challenges, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 216
(1991); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory
Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REv. 517 (1992); Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining the Harm
of Peremptory Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1027 (1990-91).
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ity.5 Second, the peremptory challenge allows counsel to remove
potential jurors whom counsel suspects are biased but who have
not demonstrated sufficient bias to justify removal by challenge for
cause. 6 Some potential jurors may be either unaware of or unwill-
ing to reveal personal prejudices or predispositions. Proponents of
the peremptory challenge argue that experienced lawyers have
learned the characteristics of such jurors and should be allowed to
use that knowledge to ensure a fair and impartial trial.7 Third, the
peremptory challenge allows defendants to remove jurors whom
they dislike, for whatever reason. As a result, proponents of the
challenge argue, the defendant is tried by jurors of his own choice
and is, therefore, more likely to view the trial as fair, to accept the
verdict, and to be more amenable to rehabilitation.8 Finally, per-
emptory challenges allow the lawyers to select jurors before whom
they feel comfortable trying the case. Proponents argue that this
increases lawyer effectiveness and, consequentially, the effective-
ness of the adversarial system in ascertaining the truth.9
On the other hand, those who would eliminate the peremptory
challenge are quick to explain its faults. First, by exercising per-
emptory challenges, the prosecution and the defense each elimi-
nate jurors thought to be partial to the other side. This interaction
produces homogenous and unrepresentative juries through the
elimination of extreme viewpoints in the community.1° Second,
peremptory challenges allow juries to become too defense-ori-
5. Gobert, supra note 3, at 529. See also Morton, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that
unless challenge for cause requirements are relaxed, the peremptory challenge will be
retained).
6. Gobert, supra note 3, at 529.
7. 1& See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE Tm JURY 123 (1983) (explaining that great
credence is given to ability of trial attorneys to detect minute traces of bias); Cressler,
supra note 3, at 394 (arguing that peremptory challenge is an effective guarantee of an
impartial jury); John R. Duer, Batson v. Kentucky- Will "O'Batson" Be Next?, 12 NAT'L
B.ACK L.J. 134, 147 (1991) (arguing that the lawyers themselves cannot ascertain whether
or not this "sixth sense" about jurors is based on body language or other non-articulable
criteria, or race or other constitutionally impermissible criteria).
8. Gobert, supra note 3, at 529.
9. Id at 530.
10. JON VAN DYKE, JURY SELEcrION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMrrMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 154 (1977). See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court
and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 153, 232 (1989) (arguing that, after the exercise of peremptories, juries are com-
posed of "left over" groups rather than the breadth of community).
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ented.11 Third, there is no principled justification for jury selection
based on race, ethnic background, gender, age, clothing, class, or
appearance-the grounds most often used to exercise peremptory
challenges. 12 Finally, peremptory challenges consume time and
money disproportionate to their value in a criminal justice
system. 13
B. Why Compare?
The voir dire/peremptory challenge system currently used in
the United States is, at best, flawed. The system is costly and time-
consuming,1 4 and fails to guarantee impartial juries.15 Nonetheless,
the previously cited arguments for and against the peremptory
challenge are powerful. In the face of this dilemma, it is useful to
search the jury systems of other countries for possible guidance.
Both England and Canada have, for many years, used peremp-
tory challenges in jury selection systems similar to our own. Fur-
thermore, the use of the peremptory challenge, in these countries
as well as the United States, was designed, from its inception, to
11. Gobert, supra note 3, at 530 (citing CannmNAL JuSTICE: PLANS FOR LEGISLATMON,
1986, CmND 9658, at 15). "Defense-oriented" means a propensity to acquit rather than
convict a defendant.
12. Rosen, supra note 4. See Bunting & Reardon, supra note 4, at 357 (arguing that it
is difficult to reconcile an arbitrary act, the peremptory challenge, with a rationally-related
test); Bray, supra note 4, at 557 (arguing that peremptory represents a blank check for
discrimination).
13. Rosen, supra note 4.
14. After 9 Months of Delays, U.S. Ties 3 for Sedition, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 12, 1989, at
A24 (nine months between jury selection and opening arguments, millions of dollars al-
ready spent); Ronald Clark, "Night Stalker" Trial Opens 34 Months After Arrest, REuTERs,
July 21, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (lawyers in Ramirez case ex-
pect jury selection to last six months); Cost for Young Trial Expected To Soar, UPI, June 9,
1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (second week of jury selection in mur-
der trial completed, estimated costs of jury selection $1,000 a day); Ian Gray, A Shamefu-
and Expensive-Logam at Death's Door, L.A. TMmEs, Dec. 17, 1989, at M3 (jury selection
in a capital case can increase trial cost by $200,000); Juryselect, UPI, Feb. 14, 1984, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (jury selection in Lancaster, California murder trial
took 129 days and cost $500,000); Lawyer Assails Investigators as Defense Opens in Sex
Abuse Case, N.Y. Tums, July 15, 1987, at A23 (jury selection in McMartin preschool case
took three months); Norco, UPI, July 24, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File (jury selection in Norco bank robbery and murder trial took five months).
15. See Rosen, supra note 4 (arguing that communities can produce entire jury pools
who are largely either supportive or suspicious of law enforcement, and that peremptory
challenges are thus ineffective in producing impartial juries); Harris, supra note 4, at 1048
(suggesting that "impartiality stems from vigorous debate among various segments of the
community" and that this is threatened when preemptory challenges eliminate certain
segments).
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serve certain values. Court opinions, statutes, floor debates of leg-
islative bodies, scholarly writings, and history provide insight into
these values. If the values underlying England and Canada's use of
peremptory challenges are comparable to those underlying the use
of peremptory challenges in the United States, then the United
States could adopt the peremptory challenge regulation of England
or Canada. If, however, the United States' system serves distinct
American values different from English or Canadian values, then
this may justify the cost, time, and possible shortcomings of the
current American system.
This Comment uses six values to compare peremptory chal-
lenge regulation in the United States, England, and Canada: (1)
the appearance of fairness to the public; (2) public participation in
the criminal justice system; (3) the rights of the individual juror; (4)
the appearance of fairness to the accused; (5) the need to get con-
victions; and (6) efficiency and cost. This Comment takes the posi-
tion that, while common values underlie the regulation of
peremptory challenges in England, Canada, and the United States,
the hierarchy of these values differs among the three countries.
The United States ranks these common values differently than
either England or Canada, and thus would be ill-advised to adopt
outright either of those countries' regulatory systems. This in-
cludes the outright abolition of peremptory challenges adopted in
England. This Comment suggests, however, based on the English
and Canadian experience, many less drastic alterations to peremp-
tory challenge regulation in the United States.
This Comment begins with an overview of the different uses of
the peremptory challenge in the United States, England, and Can-
ada. Part II.B examines the history of the peremptory challenge:
its English origin and its adoption in the United States and Canada.
Part III analyzes the modern statutory and case law development
of the peremptory challenge in the three countries, concentrating
on the underlying values intended to be served by the peremptory
challenge and each country's regulation of it. Part IV compares
these values, assessing and contrasting those values common to all
three countries. Part IV also proposes some changes to peremp-
tory challenge regulation in the United States, based on the rela-
tive weight given to these values in current American
jurisprudence. Finally, Part V proposes a way in the American sys-
tem by which to accommodate competing values.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States, England, and Canada: Different Uses of
the Peremptory Challenge
The United States, England, and Canada share the same com-
mon law tradition. 16 Embedded in this tradition is a criminal de-
fendant's right to a fair and impartial jury trial by the defendant's
peers.17 Until recently, all three countries employed similar meth-
ods to insure this right. Those methods were: (1) formation of a
jury pool or venire by the random selection of potential jurors from
among citizens of the community;18 (2) removal of a potential juror
from the jury panel by a challenge for cause if either party could
demonstrate before the court that the potential juror was unable to
decide the case impartially,1 9 both parties having unlimited chal-
lenges for cause;20 and (3) the ability of both parties to remove a
limited number of jurors from the jury panel without giving any
explanation or justification whatsoever to the court by a peremp-
tory challenge.21
While the initial selection of potential jurors and the exercise
of challenges for cause are essentially the same in all three coun-
tries,2 the regulation of the exercise of peremptory challenges is
very different. The United States has concentrated on eliminating
racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. 23 Can-
ada has recently equalized the number of challenges given to both
sides.24 England has eliminated the peremptory challenge
entirely.25
Another difference between the countries is the extent to
which potential jurors can be interrogated. Except for special cir-
16. MARY ANN GLENDoN ET AL., CoMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 161-62 (1982).
17. VALERIE P. HANS & NEEL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 30 (1986).
18. Juries Act 1974, §§ 1-9 (Eng.), reprinted in 22 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 481, 481-87
(1991); Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 626-631 (1985) (Can.); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869
(1988). See JoHN GUITHER, THE JURY IN AMERCA 47-49 (1988) (criticizing the methods
used in the United States to select potential jurors as being less than random).
19. Juries Act 1974, § 12 (Eng.), reprinted in 22 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 489 (1991);
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 638 (1985) (Can.); 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(5) (1988).
20. Id [all three citations applicable].
21. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 633-634 (1985) (Can.); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)
(U.S.). England no longer has peremptory challenges. See infra part III.C.1.
22. See supra notes 18-20.
23. See infra part III.C.
24. See infra part III.B.
25. See infra part M.A.
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cumstances, under the English and Canadian legal systems, jurors
cannot be questioned about their beliefs and prejudices during voir
dire nor can they be investigated prior to trial.26 This hinders the
English and Canadian trial attorney in obtaining the information
necessary to challenge for cause.27 In contrast, in the United
States, trial attorneys are allowed, depending on the rules of the
jurisdiction, to either submit specific questions to the court which
the judge then puts to potential jurors, or to question the potential
jurors directly.28 This enables the American trial attorney to for-
mulate a factual basis for a challenge for cause or a "hunch" basis
for a peremptory challenge. To develop these questions, prior to
trial, an American attorney may, depending on client resources and
the monetary or political value of the case, investigate attitudes in
the community from which the jury will be drawn, construct psy-
chological profiles of desirable and undesirable jurors, and even
stage mock trials in an attempt to ascertain the characteristics of
the juror most likely to return the desired verdict.29
Thus, the American system of extensive voir dire is signifi-
cantly different from jury selection procedures in England and
Canada. The American system of extensive voir dire adds time
and expense to jury trials-a factor condemned repeatedly in the
English Parliamentary debates on peremptory challenge regula-
tion.30 Nevertheless, American juries have more power and discre-
26. HANs & VMmAR, supra note 17, at 31; Gobert, supra note 3, at 530. But see
Patrick Nagel, Alberta; Keegstra Claims He's Persecuted, OttAWA CIzEN, Mar. 3, 1992, at
A5. Defendant Keegstra, acting as his own lawyer in his new trial before Alberta Court of
Queen's Bench, was allowed to question potential jurors about possible bias against him.
Charged with promoting hatred against the Jewish race, he was given a new trial after an
Alberta appeal court found Keegstra had been deprived of the right to a fair trial because
of a flawed jury selection process. Id.
27. Gobert, supra note 3, at 530.
28. See, e.g., FED. R. CRim. P. 24(a) (court may permit attorneys to examine jurors or
may itself conduct examination); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 1993) (court
conducts examination of prospective jurors, may permit attorneys to supplement examina-
tion upon showing of good cause).
29. See Diane Burch Beckham, The Art of the Voir Dire: Is It Really a Science? Com-
munity Surveys, Focus Groups Used More in Jury Selection, NJ. L.J., July 5, 1990, at 5
(discussing current trends in desirable juror investigation).
30. See, e.g., 106 PARiL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 467,502 (1986) (Eng.) ("I do not want us
to go down the road of the American courts in which four days are spent trying to swear in
a jury, which gets around to every conceivable challenge."). See also HANs & VIDMAR,
supra note 17, at 48 (lawyers in England and Canada seriously question the American
emphasis on selecting a jury).
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tion than English and Canadian juries, especially in sentencing.31
This greater measure of discretion may justify the additional time
and expense in the American system. Moreover, given the addi-
tional time and expense, Americans must believe that the extensive
questioning of potential jurors, whether by the prosecution and the
defense themselves, or by the court as their representative, is able
to successfully ascertain prejudice in the potential juror.
As these factors indicate, the value of citizen participation in
the criminal justice process underlies the American system. Citi-
zens serving on American juries are given greater control over de-
fendants than juries in England or Canada. This system is
indicative of a historically-unique American characteristic-dis-
trust of an all-powerful sovereign. Instead, Americans prefer to
trust their fellow citizens, with certain safeguards in place to root
out the most obvious prejudice. This trust, theoretically, also in-
creases the citizen's interest in making certain that the criminal jus-
tice system functions well. Thus, while the value of citizen
participation is present in the jury selection systems of England
and Canada, citizen participation is more important in the jury se-
lection procedure used in the United States.
B. The History of Peremptory Challenges in the United States,
England, and Canada
1. English Origin
The jury system and the peremptory challenge originated in
England during the Middle Ages. Initially, juries were composed
of community members who were chosen to serve as jurors be-
cause they had actual knowledge of the facts of the case.32 At first,
although both parties could challenge for cause any proposed ju-
ror,3 3 the Crown controlled the selection of the jury panel and held
an unlimited number of peremptory challenges.34 It must be
remembered that during the Middle Ages, the Crown was both
31. HANs & VMMAR, supra note 17, at 31-32. Depending on the jurisdiction, Ameri-
can juries may determine length of sentence and application of death penalty. Also, de-
fendants have a right to a jury trial in many more cases in the United States than in either
England or Canada.
32. LL WD E. MooRE, Tim JURY 37 (2d ed. 1988). "If it developed that the jurors
testified under oath that they were unacquainted with the facts, other jurors were sum-
moned until there were 12 who had knowledge and who agreed." I&
33. Id.
34. Broderick, supra note 4, at 371.
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law-maker and law-enforcer. In this role, the Crown assumed re-
sponsibility for ensuring that the jury was composed of community
members with sufficient first-hand knowledge of the facts. The
Crown was expected to use its unlimited peremptory challenges to
select the most competent jury.
As time passed, however, the jury evolved from a body of fact-
knowers, that is, community members who knew the facts, to a
body of fact-finders, community members who decided the case
based only on the evidence presented at trial. This change in the
jury precipitated the need for the jury to be impartial3 5 or "indiffer-
ent."36 As a body of fact-finders, it was important that the jury
make decisions based on evidence presented in court, not on per-
sonal bias or even knowledge. 37 Hence, there was no longer any
reason for the Crown to make certain that jurors have sufficient
first-hand knowledge. Thus, in 1305, Parliament found that a jury
essentially selected by the Crown was "obnoxious to justice"38 and
eliminated the Crown's peremptory challenges.39
Although what Parliament meant by the words "obnoxious to
justice" is not facially obvious, the historical context provides some
illumination. By 1305, the Magna Carta4° had been signed. Parlia-
ment had initiated the political struggle to force the Monarchy to
accept the rule of law-law to be created by Parliament. In this
struggle, the Crown often perceived those who opposed its abso-
lute power as its enemies. Obviously, if the Crown exercised un-
limited peremptory challenges, juries would consist only of those
jurors known to be sympathetic to the Crown regardless of the evi-
dence. It can be hypothesized that, by eliminating the Crown's use
of the peremptory challenge, Parliament sought to reduce the
Monarchy's ability to convict its political enemies. Perhaps what
Parliament really meant by the word "justice" was a decrease in
the absolute power of the Monarchy.
35. Gobert, supra note 3, at 528.
36. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878) ("A juror to be impartial must,
... 'be indifferent as he stands unsworn."' (quoting SIR EDWARD CorE, LrrrLETON
155(b)).
37. Gobert, supra note 3, at 528.
38. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 147.
39. An Ordinance for Inquests (Challenge of Jurors), 1305, 33 Edw., ch. 4. "[I]f they
that sue for the King will challenge any of those Jurors, they shall assign of their Challenge
a Cause certain, and the Truth of the same Challenge shall be enquired of according to the
Custom of the Court .. " Id
40. 9 Hen. 3, ch. 39 (1215).
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Parliament's elimination of the Crown's peremptory chal-
lenges indicates the emergence of a value in English society. This
value can be characterized as "democratization," or a willingness
to spread the governing power among a larger group of individuals
within a given populace. Along with an extension of power, de-
mocratization requires an extension of trust. The individuals to
whom the power is extended are trusted to wield that power in a
predictable manner. Thus, when Parliament eliminated the
Crown's peremptory challenges, it trusted that the jurors who re-
placed the jurors sympathetic to the Crown would wield their
power in a certain way. Parliament may have hoped that such ju-
rors would refuse to convict defendants accused unfairly of "trea-
son" against the Crown. Parliament probably did not expect such
jurors to engage in wholesale acquittals.
Parliament's expectations were short-lived, however.
Notwithstanding Parliament's finding that a jury essentially se-
lected by the Crown was "obnoxious to justice," English jurists
quickly circumvented Parliament's elimination of the Crown's per-
emptory challenges by creating the "standby." 41 A "standby" is a
potential juror against whom the prosecutor initially assigns, with-
out explanation, a challenge for cause.4 2 The court then directs
these jurors so assigned to "standby" until all other potential jurors
in the panel have been examined by the parties. If the twelve-
member jury is not selected from the panel of potential jurors, only
then is the standby juror recalled, and only then is the prosecutor
required to prove the challenge for cause previously assigned.43 As
it is almost always possible to select a twelve-member unchallenged
jury, the Crown's standbys operate, for all practical purposes, ex-
actly like the peremptory challenges eliminated by Parliament.44
41. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohi-
bition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 10 n.34
(1990). See JOHN PRoFFATr, A TREATISE ON TRIAL By JuRY § 160, at 211-13 (1880).
42. Colbert, supra note 41, at 10 n.34. The English jurists apparently assumed that
cause existed whenever the Crown wanted to challenge a juror. This assumption justified
the practice of "standing by" jurors. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 148.
43. Colbert, supra note 41, at 10 n.34.
44. VA DYKE, supra note 10, at 148. So rarely does the entire jury panel fail to
produce 12 unchallenged jurors that, when a prosecutor (Mr. Jones) was asked in 1699 to
"show cause" for the persons who were "standing aside," he replied, "I do not know, in all
my practice of this nature, that it was ever put upon the king to shew [sic) cause; and I
believe some of the king's counsel will say they have not known it done." Thal of Spencer
Cowper, at Hertford Assizes, for the Murder of Mrs. Sarah Stout, 13 HowELL's SrkTE
TRIALS 1106, 1108 (1699) (Eng.).
1993]
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Although defendants challenged this practice on numerous occa-
sions, such challenges were always unsuccessful. 45
Conceivably, the English jurists created the standby out of a
mistrust of the democratization of the English jury. Loyalty to the
Crown was equated with adherence to the law.46 A juror who was
not sympathetic to the Crown was likely to be of a criminal nature,
not unlike the defendant. Thus, democratization of juries meant
that juries would be too defense-oriented. Most likely, the major-
ity of English jurists believed that they conducted trials fairly, even
though the Crown controlled jury selection. At the very least, the
English jurists were confident that a Crown prosecutor would
never standby a juror unless the Crown prosecutor reasonably be-
lieved that the juror could be challenged for cause successfully. 47
After all, the Crown prosecutor was bound to uphold the law.
Thus, the value that Parliament's legislation intended to pro-
mote, i.e. the "democratization" of juries, was seemingly subverted
by the English jurists' confidence in the fairness of the Crown pros-
ecutor as an officer of the court. The creation of the standby marks
the beginning of a conflict between confidence in the fairness of
the prosecutor as an officer of the court versus a suspicion of plac-
ing too much power in the prosecutor as representative of the sov-
ereign.48 This is a recurring value conflict in the peremptory
challenge regulation of the United-States, England, and Canada.49
Although Parliament eliminated the Crown's peremptory
challenges in 1305, it left untouched the common law tradition that
permitted criminal defendants to excuse potential jurors without
.. 45. See, e.g., Anonymous, 1 Vent. 309, 86 Eng. Rep. 199 (information for forgery,
prosecution allowed to standby without cause); Trial of Ford Lord Grey of Werk for De-
bauching the Lady Henrietta Berkeley, 9 HowEu..'s STATE TRIALS 127, 128-29 (1682)
(Eng.) (although defense pressed prosecution to show cause, standby was allowed); Trials
of James O'Coigly for High Treason, 26 Hownu's STATE TRiAls 1191, 1231-43 (1798)
(Eng.) (defense made prodigious argument that prosecution show cause, but to no avail).
46. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 17, at 29 (partiality to the Crown was sanctioned
by the courts).
47. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 148.
48. This conflict is significant. In a democracy, where the sovereign is the majority,
the sovereign's control over jury composition may be seen as majority rule. When the
sovereign controls jury composition, jury nullification of majority rule, i.e. law, is highly
unlikely. When a democratic sovereign relinquishes some control over jury composition,
the control relinquished may be wielded by the minority, or even an anti-majoritarian ele-
ment. Thus, by relinquishing control of jury composition, the sovereign allows possible
jury nullification.
49. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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cause.50 Conceivably, this prompted William Blackstone to charac-
terize the peremptory challenge as a defendant's privilege-"a pro-
vision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which
our English laws are justly famous."51 Blackstone reasoned that
the "law wills [that the defendant should not] be tried by any one
man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without be-
ing able to assign a reason for his dislike [because] a prisoner
should have a good opinion of his jury. '5 2 Blackstone also pro-
posed that if a challenge for cause proved "insufficient to set aside
the juror, perhaps the bare questioning [of] his indifference may
sometimes provoke a resentment." 53 Thus, Blackstone concluded,
the defendant's ability to remove that juror on a peremptory chal-
lenge was necessary to "prevent all ill consequences" 5' of such
resentment.
The value that Blackstone articulated may be characterized as
the appearance of fairness to the accused. When the criminal de-
fendant is afforded more peremptory challenges than the prosecu-
tion, it is likely that the appearance of fairness to the accused ranks
high in importance in that criminal justice system. For example,
federal courts and many state courts in the United States give crim-
inal defendants more peremptory challenges than the prosecution.
In contrast, in Canada, the defense and prosecution are afforded
an equal number of peremptory challenges, and, in England, per-
emptory challenges no longer exist. In questioning peremptory
challenge regulation in the United States, one must consider
whether or not it is appropriate to accord such high importance to
the appearance of fairness to the accused.
Over the centuries, the British Parliament reduced the number
of peremptory challenges available to the defense. By 1530, de-
fendants were allowed only twenty, unless charged with high trea-
son, in which case thirty-five peremptory challenges were
permitted.55
50. Broderick, supra note 4, at 372.
51. 4 WILLIAM B AcKsgroNE, COMMENTARIES *352.
52. Id. at *352-53.
53. Id. at *353.
54. Id.
55. For Abjurations and Santuarieis, 1530, 22 Hen. 8, ch. 14, § 6 (Eng.).
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2. Early Use of Peremptory Challenges in Canada
When English colonists came to Canada, they brought the
English use of peremptory challenges and standbys with them. As
the Canadian colonies developed, local statutes were passed that
differed from each other and from the English regulation of per-
emptory challenges and standbys. For example, New Brunswick,
by legislation, restored the Crown's right to exercise peremptory
challenges.5 6 Conversely, in the colony of Upper Canada, statutes
did not allow the Crown to use peremptory challenges, but legisla-
tion protected the Crown's right to order an unlimited number of
jurors to standby.
5 7
After the Canadian colonies joined to become a Confedera-
tion, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1869 attempted to consolidate
these inconsistent pre-Confederation colonial statutes regulating
peremptory challenges.5 8 While this attempt at consolidation re-
sulted in some confusion, by the time the Criminal Code of 1892
was introduced, Crown prosecutors had both a right to four per-
emptory challenges and an unlimited power to standby jurors.5 9 In
1917, the Crown's standbys were limited to forty-eight.6
3. Early Use of Peremptory Challenges in the United States61
American colonial courts adopted, as common law, the Eng-
lish statutory right of a defendant to exercise peremptory chal-
56. Alan W. Mewett, The Jury Stand.by, 30 Crum. L.Q. 385, 385 (1987-88).
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. 29, § 668(9) (1892) (Can.), cited in Bain v. The Queen,
87 D.L.R.4th 449, 492 (1992); Mewett, supra note 56, at 385.
60. An Act To Amend the Criminal Code (respecting jurors), R.S.C. ch. 13, § 1 (1917)
(Can.), cited in Bain v. The Queen, 87 D.L.R.4th 449, 492 (1992). The authorities are di-
vided as to the reason underlying the limitation to 48 standbys. One commentator pro-
poses that although in England, the Crown was allowed unlimited stand-asides, in Canada,
the Crown was limited to 48 because it was difficult to gather sufficiently large jury panels
to allow for unlimited stand-asides. Mewett, supra note 56, at 385. The majority opinion in
Bain quotes a statement made by the Minister of Justice, Hon. C.J. Doherty, when the
legislation limiting the stand-asides was being debated:
Perhaps it may be more correct to say that the more you increase the number of
men from whom the Crown can, by this process of elimination, select the twelve
that it wants, the more you increase the opportunity for the Crown to find a jury
exactly to its liking.
H.C. DEn., AUG. 9, 1917, AT 4309, quoted in Bain, 87 D.L.R.4th at 492.
61. United States Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and John Paul Stevens, in
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), advance disparate versions of the history of the
peremptory challenge and its application to modem interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment. Justice Scalia asserts repeatedly that both the prosecution and the defense
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lenges.62 The original drafters of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 63 proposed that it include "the right of
challenge." 64 Nevertheless, this language was deleted by the Sen-
ate prior to ratification65 because, according to one commentator,
it was assumed that a right to an "impartial jury"66 included a guar-
antee of the right to question and challenge jurors.67 Despite this
"assumption," in 1790, Congress passed legislation which afforded
to American defendants the same number of peremptory chal-
lenges as those afforded by Parliament to defendants in England:
thirty-five when charged with treason and twenty for all other capi-
tal crimes.68
The 1790 legislation made no mention of governmental use of
either peremptory challenges or standbys. 69 Any prosecutorial use
of standbys was controversial and there was significant protest
against it.70 While some states authorized the use of standbys by
the prosecution, 71 most states eventually chose to authorize
had the right to exercise peremptories at the time the United States Constitution was
adopted. lit at 481, 482 n.1. Justice Stevens contends that the exercise of peremptory
challenges by the prosecutor was controversial during this period and "was a subject of
debate throughout the 18th and 19th centuries ... h" i at 518 n.15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
62. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 148.
63. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
64. GAzEr OF THE U.S., Aug. 29, 1789, at 158.
65. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 518 n.15 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing 1 ANNALs OF CONGREss 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
66. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, supra note 63.
67. S. Mac Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional
Right, 39 BROOK. L. Rnv. 290, 297-99 (1973). James Madison stated: "Where a technical
word ["impartial"] was used ... , all the incidents belonging to it necessarily attended it.
The right to challenge is incident to the trial by jury, and, therefore, as one is secured, so is
the other." HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 17, at 37 (quoting James Madison, Virginia Rati-
fication Debates). Cf. Patrick Henry's criticism of the failure to specifically include in the
Sixth Amendment a defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenge, "If [the people)
dare oppose the hands of tyrannical power, you will see what has happened elsewhere.
They will be tried by the most partial powers, by their most implacable enemies.... with
all the forms of a fair trial.... I would rather the trial by.jury were struck out altogether."
Id. (quoting Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratification Debates).
68. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9,
§ 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
69. Id.
70. Jon M. Van Dyke, Peremptory Challenges Revisited, 12 NAT'L BLAcK L.J. 114, 119
(1991).
71. Appellate courts in Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
and South Carolina approved of the prosecutorial use of standbys in the early 19th century.
Id. at 119 n.28.
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prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges.72 In 1827, Justice
Story stated in dictum that a prosecutor had a right to the standby
as part of common law inherited from England.73 In 1856, how-
ever, the Court in United States v. Shackleford74 held that Federal
courts were not required to permit standbys and directed the
courts to follow the law of the state in which they sat.75 Even
though Shackleford's effect was contained because many states had
already given prosecutors the use of peremptory strikes,76 Con-
gress passed a legislation in 1865 granting the Federal Government
five peremptory challenges in capital and treason cases and two in
non-capital felonies.77
The grant to state and Federal prosecutors of the power to
exercise peremptory challenges represented a growing trust in gov-
ernment among Americans. One commentator has characterized
the establishment of prosecutorial ability to peremptorily remove
potential jurors as the "mistrust of government typical of the Revo-
lutionary era . . . giv[ing] way to increasing acceptance of state
power."78  The significance of this development cannot be
overlooked.
In England, the shift in political power from an absolute mon-
archy to a representative Parliament was slow. A similar process
occurred in Canada. In the United States, however, the shift in
political power occurred through rebellion. Prior to that rebellion,
many American colonists had developed a deep mistrust of their
English rulers and of government in general.79 This mistrust is evi-
denced most strongly in America's written Constitution and Bill of
Rights. Unlike England, which continues to this day to be gov-
72. New York did not grant prosecutorial use of the peremptory challenge until 1881;
Virginia refused prosecutorial use until 1919. l at 119 n.27.
73. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483 (1827).
74. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1856).
75. Id at 590.
76. See VAN DY E, supra note 10, at 150, 171 n.57. By 1856, 14 states permitted the
prosecution to exercise peremptory strikes: Arkansas, Alabama, California, Delaware,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Others, such as Connecticut, passed comparable legislation
soon after Shackleford. See Colbert, supra note 41, at 11 n.39 (discussing states' adoption
of peremptory challenge during the 1800s).
77. Act Regulating Proceedings in Criminal Cases, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500 (1865).
The same statute gave defendants in capital or treason cases 20 peremptory strikes, and
defendants in non-capital felony cases 10.
78. VAN DYrE, supra note 10, at 150.
79. See id. at 141 (noting that controversial trials became a focal point for political
disputes during the American Revolution).
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erned under an evolving, unwritten Constitutional base of shared
political thought based on various historical developments, Ameri-
cans demanded a written Constitution developed, in large part, to
limit the power of government. After the Revolution, however,
Americans began to look to the Government for protection of
their property interests. This developing trust in government was
reflected by granting that government greater power in criminal
prosecutions. 8o
Further evidence of this growing confidence is seen in the 1887
Supreme Court decision in Hayes v. Missouri. In Hayes, the
Supreme Court expressed the view that the state has a legitimate
interest in removing some elements from the jury:
The public prosecutor may have the strongest reasons to distrust
the character of a juror offered, from his habits and associations,
and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection
to him. In our large cities there is such a mixed population[;]
there is such a tendency of the criminal classes to resort to them,
and such an unfortunate disposition on the part of business men
to escape from jury duty, that it requires special care on the part
of the government to secure the[s]e competent and impartial
jurors.8
1
Such language reflects the Supreme Court's confidence, likely un-
founded, that the prosecution would use its peremptory strikes
"fairly" to secure for the community only an impartial trial, not
necessarily a conviction. This parallels the English jurists' similar
trust that the Crown would use its standbys in a fair and objective
manner.
The Supreme Court's language also evidences a deep distrust
of the working classes and, probably, certain ethnic groups. Obvi-
ously, the Court feared jury nullification if too many jurors came
from certain sections of the populace. This fear represents another
value in the use of juries in a criminal justice system-getting con-
victions. When, in the perception of the politically powerful, 82 ju-
ries fail to convict defendants often enough and too many
"criminals" escape punishment, the politically powerful perceive
80. Id at 150.
81. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887). Three years later, the Supreme
Court, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), invalidated a state statute provid-
ing that only white males could serve as jurors.
82. The "politically powerful" may be the majority of voters in a populace or simply
those capable of persuading legislators to take action.
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the criminal justice system within which those juries operate as
working improperly.8 When the politically powerful segments of a
society believe that too many criminals are "getting off," jury selec-
tion procedures, including peremptory challenges, will be changed
to reflect the ascendance of the value of getting convictions.84
A further parallel to the English system is found in Lewis v.
United States.85 The Court in Lewis echoed Blackstone by ascrib-
ing two functions to the peremptory challenge.86 First, the peremp-
tory challenge guarantees the defendant a good opinion of his
jury,8 7 and second, the peremptory challenge protects the defend-
ant from the possible resentment of jurors who had been unsuc-
cessfully challenged for cause.88
The major difference between the English and American sys-
tems at this time was the balance of peremptory challenges/
standbys between the government and the defendant. American
legislation limited the government's peremptory strikes to a
number less than those given to the defendant. In practice, this
meant that the government had less control over the composition
of the jury. In contrast, the English defendant had a limited
number of peremptory strikes while the Crown was allowed to ex-
ercise unlimited standbys. Consequently, the Crown could control
fully the composition of the jury.
83. See infra notes 96-107, 115 and accompanying text (England's abolition of per-
emptory challenges based on government's perception of a need for more convictions).
84. Several new crime control bills are currently pending in the United States Con-
gress, all of which would reduce the number of peremptory challenges accorded defend-
ants from 10 to 6, thereby equalizing, in federal cases, the number of peremptory
challenges available to the defense and prosecution. Inherent in this proposed change is
the belief that reducing the defendant's control over jury selection will increase convictions
and, thus, deter crime. See H.R. 688, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 6, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) ("[t]o prevent and punish sexual violence and domestic violence, to assist and
protect the victims of such crimes, to assist State and local efforts, and for other pur-
poses"); H.R. 2217, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2847, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.
8, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) ("[t]o control and prevent crime"); H.R. 2872, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) ("[io prevent and punish crime, to strengthen the rights of crime victims,
to assist State and local efforts against crime, and for other purposes"); S. 1356, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) ("[tlo restore order, deter crime, and make our neighborhoods and
communities safer and more secure places in which to live and work").
85. 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
86. Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376.
87. "[T]he law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom he has
conceived a prejudice even without being able to assign a reason for his dislike." Id.
88. Id.
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The difference between the American and English systems
produced juries that served different values. The American jury
was selected by a system that allowed for greater diversity in the
jurors chosen. The defense, in exercising its peremptory chal-
lenges, was likely to reject jurors whose economic class and back-
ground were such that they were thought to be unsympathetic to
the defendant. Regardless of whether such judgments were justi-
fied, they produced a diversity of input into the American criminal
justice system. The American system also allowed a broader ex-
panse of the populace to directly participate in the legal system
governing themselves and their neighbors. This served to
strengthen civic responsibility and involvement among citizens, an-
other value of jury systems.
Of course, getting a conviction can be more difficult when the
defense is afforded a large amount of jury control. Defense-ori-
ented juries can disregard the law and refuse to convict a defendant
even when the evidence of guilt is compelling. In a representative
democracy, when laws are presumably made according to the will
of the majority of the populace, jury nullification of such laws is
counter-majoritarian. By allowing the Crown greater control of
the jury composition, the English system, on the other hand, better
served the value of getting convictions.
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
REGULATION
A. England
As of January 5, 1989, criminal defendants in England could
no longer exercise peremptory challenges.8 9 On the same date, the
Crown's use of the standby was severely curtailed. 90 As a result,
random selection now forms most English juries. The vehicle man-
dating this change was the Criminal Justice Act of 1988.91 Like all
legislation, the Criminal Justice Act was enacted to promote spe-
cific values. The events leading up to the'passage of the Act, and
the Parliamentary debates preceding that passage, elucidate these
values.
89. Gobert, supra note 3, at 528.
90. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON THE EXERCISE BY THE CROWN OF ITS
RIGHT OF STANDBY, reprinted in [1988] 3 All ER 1086, 1086.
91. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33 § 118(1) (Eng.).
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Before the criminal defendant's right to exercise peremptory
challenges was eliminated by the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, it
was diminished by two preceding Acts. The Juries Act of 1974 re-
duced to seven the number of peremptory challenges available to
the defendant in felony trials.92 The Juries Act was amended in
1977, further reducing the number of peremptory challenges avail-
able to the criminal defendant to three. 93 The Crown's use of
standbys, a creation of the judiciary and never legislated, remained
unlimited.
In March of 1986, the Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment presented to Parliament a White Paper 94 announcing the
Government's plans to introduce a new Criminal Justice Bill during
the next session of Parliament. 95 The Government's stated objec-
tives, relevant to this Comment, in enacting the new Bill were as
follows:
(a) To ensure that the courts have an adequate range of powers
to enable them to punish the most serious offenders with the
right measure of severity and to enable less serious offenders to
be dealt with effectively in the community.
(b) To ensure that the court system and its related services op-
erate as efficiently and as effectively as possible.9
The White Paper proposed that a criminal defendant's right to ex-
ercise the peremptory challenge be either abolished or further lim-
ited.97 According to the Government, this was necessary because
defendants were using the peremptory challenge "as a means of
getting rid of jurors whose mere appearance is thought to indicate
a degree of insight or respect for the law which is inimical to the
interests of the defence." 98 The Government maintained that this
use of peremptory challenges was especially significant when multi-
ple defendants pooled their peremptory challenges, and alleged
92. Juries Act, 1974, ch. 23, § 12 (Eng.).
93. Criminal Law Act, 1977, ch. 45, § 43 (Eng.).
94. CRIMINAL JU sTICE: PLANS FOR LEGISLATION, 1986, CMND 9658 [hereinafter
CmN 9658]. White Paper is another name for Command Paper.
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 15-16 (proposing that alternatives to the abolition of the peremptory chal-
lenge were further reductions in the number of challenges available to the criminal defend-
ant, especially in multi-defendant cases). See also Samuel J. Cohen, The Regulation of
Peremptory Challenges in the United States and England, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 287, 306-07
(1988) (detailing alternatives).
98. CmND 9658, supra note 94, at 15.
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that "[a]n entire jury can thereby be replaced.., if the defendants
can settle upon a common object." 99
In order to obtain empirical evidence to support these asser-
tions, the Government commissioned a Crown Prosecution Service
survey on the effect of peremptory challenges. 10° Unfortunately
for the Secretary of State for the Home Office, the survey results
did not support the assertions made in the White Paper. This sur-
vey found that, in both single-defendant and multiple-defendant
trials, the conviction rate was six to eight percent higher in trials in
which peremptory challenges were exercised than in trials in which
no peremptory challenges were exercised. 10 1 No evidence of wide-
spread pooling of peremptory challenges in multi-defendant cases
was found to support the Government's claim of this practice. 102 In
the face of these results, the Home Secretary countered that "no
argument can be based either way on that set of statistics," but
admitted that the Government's case for the abolition of peremp-
tory challenges was based on "logic and common sense" rather
than on statistical evidence.10 3
The paramount value, then, driving the Government's efforts
to abolish the peremptory challenge, was the need to get the "right
99. It See also Gobert, supra note 3, at 530 (alleging government feared defense
oriented juries).
100. CmND 9658, supra note 94, at 16. The survey began in December 1985. Initially,
only cases conducted by the Director of Public Prosecutions were surveyed. Coverage was
extended during 1986 to cases handled by the new Crown Prosecution Service in metropol-
itan counties, excluding London. In October 1986, the survey was extended to include all
of England, and this coverage continued until the survey's completion in December 1986.
Julie Vennard & David Riley, Home Office Research and Planning Unit, The Use of Per-
emptory Challenge and Stand by of Jurors and Their Relationship to Trial Outcome, 1988
CRIM. L. Rav. 731, 734. See also Gobert, supra note 3, at 531 (discussing survey).
101. Vennard & Riley, supra note 100, at 737. In single-defendant trials, the conviction
rate was 49.6% when no peremptory challenges were exercised, as opposed to 55.6% when
they were. In multi-defendant trials, conviction rate was 59.9% when no peremptory chal-
lenges were exercised, as opposed to 68.1% when they were. Id. As Vennard and Riley
point out, however, the defense may have been more likely to challenge jurors when the
prospects of acquittal were weakest. See id. Peremptory challenges were used most fre-
quently in inner London (three times the equivalent rates in the metropolitan counties),
and the Crown standby and challenge for cause were used infrequently in all parts of the
country. Id at 738.
102. Id. Peremptory challenges were used in approximately one-third of multi-defend-
ant cases as compared to one-fifth of single-defendant cases. The maximum allowable
number of peremptory challenges were used by the defense in six percent of all single-
defendant trials, and the maximum allowable number of peremptory challenges were used
in one percent of multi-defendant cases. Id. at 736.
103. 113 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 996-97 (1987).
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result," namely, convictions. Even without any statistical basis, the
Government feared that guilty defendants were escaping punish-
ment by manipulating jury selection through their use of peremp-
tory challenges. 104 While the White Paper acknowledged that the
peremptory challenge served some values,10 5 the Government
clearly thought that these values were subordinate to crime
control.
After the Criminal Justice Bill promised in the White Paper
was introduced in Parliament, it became clear that not everyone
agreed with the Government. During the Parliamentary debates,
four arguments were made in support of retaining peremptory
challenges. First, peremptory challenges could be used to increase
demographic representation absent from a jury.1°6 Second, elimi-
nation of peremptory challenges would create pressure to expand
the use of the challenge for cause.1°7 Third, peremptory challenges
advance defendant confidence in the jury. °8 Fourth, contrary to
104. See id. at 986. Mr. Jessel, supporter of the Home Secretary, argued that defend-
ants use peremptory challenges to obtain a-bias towards acquittal and that this "is not fair
to the general public who want to be protected against vicious and violent crime." Id
105. CmxD 9658, supra note 94, at 14-15 (acknowledging that peremptory challenges,
on occasion, serve the following values: promote defendant's confidence in jury, save time
and embarrassment when used as a substitute for challenge for cause, and can adjust dem-
ographic composition of jury for fairer hearing).
106. See, e.g., 106 PARL. DEn., H.C., (6th ser.) 467, 479 (1986) (arguing that the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges could increase the chances of appropriate racial or gender
mix on jury); 113 PArL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 974 (1987) (arguing that use of peremp-
tory challenges helps to adjust the balance of jurors when an imperfect system has pro-
duced an unequal balance); id. at 978 (explaining that peremptory challenges do not alter
jury to make it convict or acquit, but can alter it to make it more representative).
107. See, e.g., 106 PAr. Da., H.C. (6th ser.) 467, 496 (1986) (arguing that elimination
of the peremptory challenge will result in forcing courts to rule on whether potential jurors
can be challenged on the basis of race, gender, occupation, etc., causing embarrassment
and inefficiency); id at 502 ("I do not want us to go down the road of the American courts
in which four days are spent trying to swear in a jury, which gets around every conceivable
challenge."); id at 505 ("It will strip away the privacy of jurymen."); 113 PARE. DEn. H.C.
(6th ser.) 972, 974 (1987) (arguing that'jurors are more likely to feel aggrieved if challenged
for cause rather than peremptorily excused); id at 979-80 (arguing that jurors who appear
to be illiterate, asleep, frivolous, labile, drunk, or drugged will be difficult to remove and/or
insulted when challenged for cause).
108. See, e.g., 106 PARt. DEn., H.C. (6th ser.) 467, 505 (1986) ("If a black defendant
cannot have at least some black jurymen if he wants them, if a woman cannot have at least
some women, or if a young person cannot have at least some youngish people on the jury,
how can we believe that there will be confidence in the jury system by those whose co-
operation, after all, is absolutely vital for the process of a criminal trial?"); 113 PARL. DEn.,
H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 975 (1987) ("If [the accused] is sent to prison-and we seem to be
sending more people to prison than any other nation-it is important that when he is in
prison he should feel that he had a fair trial with an opportunity to be fully represented and
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the Government's assertions, defendants generally do not misuse
peremptory challenges nor do they gain advantage by exercising
them.'O9
Other ministers made the following arguments in favor of the
elimination of peremptory challenges. First, the exercise of per-
emptory challenges derogates the randomness of jury selection that
is the essence of the jury system.110 Second, the wholesale removal
of potential jurors about whom the defendant knows nothing be-
yond their name and appearance undermines public confidence in
the jury system."' Third, in cases where multiple defendants are
being tried together, it is wrong in principle that the composition of
the jury can be radically altered by the defense." 2 Fourth, unlike
criminal justice during the time of Blackstone, the system is no
longer heavily tilted against the defense.
113
to express himself."); id. at 992-93 (explaining that peremptory challenge is defendant's
safety valve against jurors who may have been put there by prosecution to secure a convic-
tion and that a system of justice does not workas long as there is bitterness in any accused
person who thinks the system is rigged against him).
109. See, e.g., 106 PAre.. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 467, 504 (1986) (arguing that the idea
that guilty people are acquitted wholesale because defendants are tailoring juries is con-
trary to experience of those who practice in criminal courts); 113 PAR.i DEB., H.C. (6th
ser.) 972, 973, 979 (1987) (pointing out that statistics fail to indicate misuse by or advantage
to defense). But see 113 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 986-88 (statements of Mr. Jessel
& Mr. Bruinvels) (asserting that current low conviction rate was due to misuse of peremp-
tory challenge by defendants).
110. See, e.g., 106 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 467, 474 (1986) (statement of Home
Secretary); 113 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 973 (1987) (argument set forth by Home
Secretary); id at 982 (arguing that, if one believes in trial by jury of 12 of one's fellow
citizens, one must accept that they should be 12 of one's fellow citizens chosen at random,
and that there should be no ability to attempt to manipulate jury in favor of defense); id. at
983-84 (arguing that peremptory challenges actually preserve random nature of jury). But
see, e.g., 113 PARL. DEn., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 973-74 (1987) (pointing to studies showing
that selection of jurors is far from random; Irish, Asians, West Indians, and women are
under-represented on juries). Cf 113 PA.RL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 995 (1987) (state-
ment of Home Secretary) ("[I]f we are to try to reflect the defendant's world, peremptory
challenge is a very blunt engineering tool with which to do it. If the objective is to secure a
delicate balance on the jury, or to make sure that the jury is fully representative, the whole
system is faulty and peremptory challenge will not put it right.").
111. See, e.g., 106 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 467, 474 (1986) (statement of Secretary
of State for Home Department); id at 510 ("demeaning and degrading to the fair face of
British justice for members of the bar to treat jurors rather like auctioneers at cattle
markets").
112. Id at 474.
113. See, e.g., id. at 480; 113 PARt. DEn., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 973 (1987) (statement of
Home Secretary) (arguing that defense right to peremptory challenge gives defendant a
substantially favorable "tilt").
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Some members of Parliament found the abolition of peremp-
tory challenges also objectionable because nothing in the proposed
legislation addressed the Crown's right to standby jurors.114 Thus,
they proposed two amendments designed to regulate the right of
the Crown to standby jurors. One amendment proposed that the
Crown be required to support motions to standby jurors with
cause. 115 The other amendment would have limited the number of
standbys available to the Crown to three.1 16 Supporters of these
amendments argued that they were necessary to equalize the pros-
ecution and the defense if peremptory challenges were to be
eliminated. 11
7
The arguments for retention of peremptory challenges and the
adoption of amendments to limit the use of standbys were de-
feated. 118 Parliament abolished peremptory challenges in the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988119 and enacted no legislation regulat-
ing standbys. A few months after the passage of the Criminal Jus-
tice Act of 1988 and prior to the date of its effect,12 the Attorney
General issued a guideline directing Crown prosecutors not to use
the standby,121 except when both the Crown prosecutor and the
defense agree that the juror is "manifestly unsuitable."1 22 The
principle underlying the guidelines, as stated therein, was that
members of a jury should be generally selected at random from the
panel123 and that the prosecution should not use its right of standby
114. 113 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 993 (1987).
115. Cohen, supra note 97, at 308 n.122 (citing CRImINAL JusTICE BILL AMENDMENTS,
STANDING Comm. F, 359-60 (Feb. 26, 1987); CRIMINAL JusTiCE BILL AMENDMENTS,
STANDING Con. F, 19 (Dec. 16, 1986)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 308 n.124 (citing PARL. DEB., H.C., STANDING Comm. F, 816 (28th Sitting,
Mar. 3, 1987)).
118. Id. (citing 113 PARL DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1006-07 (1987); PARL. DEE., H.C.,
STANDING Comm. F, 866 (29th Sitting, Mar. 3, 1987)).
119. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 118(1) (Eng.).
120. Criminal Justice Bill was passed by the House of Commons on July 28, 1988, and
became effective on January 5, 1989. Cohen, supra note 97, at 308; Gobert, supra note 3, at
528.
121. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON THE EXERCISE BY THE CROWN OF ITS
RIGHT OF STANDBY, supra note 90, § 3.
122. Id. § 5, at 1086-87. An example is where a juror selected to try a complex case is
found to be illiterate. Id. As might be expected, opponents of the Criminal Justice Bill
considered these guidelines to be overly vague. Cohen, supra note 97, at 314 (citing PARL.
DEB. H.C., STANDING COMM. F, 825, 827 (28th Sitting, Mar. 3, 1987)).
123. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON THE EXERCISE BY THE CROWN OF ITS
RIGHT OF STANDBY, supra note 90, § 2.
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to influence the overall composition of the jury or to gain a tactical
advantage. 124
The Attorney General's guideline reserved from its directive,
however, cases involving terrorist activities and national security.
125
In all other cases, investigation of jurors is limited to a routine
check of criminal records. 126 In national security and terrorist ac-
tivity cases, further investigation of jurors can be conducted to as-
certain the existence of two reasons for the Crown's exercise of a
standby. 27 First, to find out whether the potential juror, either vol-
untarily or under duress, will likely make improper use of sensitive
evidence revealed in camera, and second, to discover whether the
juror's political beliefs are so biased as to go beyond normally
reflecting the broad spectrum of views and interests in the com-
munity to reflect the extreme views of sectarian interest or pres-
sure group to a degree which might interfere with his fair
assessment of the facts of the case or lead him to exert improper
pressure on his fellow jurors.128
Based on the reasons above, the Attorney General may personally
authorize exercise of a Crown standby against the suspect potential
juror.129
The passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, the Parlia-
mentary debates and committee reports preceding its passage, and
the Attorney General's guidelines issued subsequent to its passage
indicate that, while the value of the public appearance of fairness is
important to England's regulation of peremptory challenges, it is
not paramount. Particularly telling is the Attorney General's spe-
cific exception for national security and terrorist cases, when a po-
tential juror may be excluded from the jury due to political beliefs.
It appears from this exception that when political stakes are high,
the value of obtaining a conviction supersedes the value of diverse
community input into the criminal justice system. Under the Eng-
lish system, in cases involving "terrorist activities and national se-
curity," a randomly-selected jury is not trusted to do justice.
124. Id. § 1.
125. ATORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON JURY CHECKS §§ 4, 9, reprinted in [1988]
3 All ER 1087, 1087-88.
126. Id. §§ 2-3, at 1087.
127. Id §§ 3-4.
128. Id. § 5.
129. Id. § 9.
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Nevertheless, a 1982 interview study with English barristers130
from Cardiff, Wales, conducted by Valerie P. Hans, indicates that
this could be an inaccurate assessment of the value hierarchy un-
derlying English peremptory challenge regulation. The majority of
the barristers surveyed "expressed the belief that the jury should
be drawn at random and stated that they rarely used their right to
challenge."'131 One barrister who had been practicing for nine
years stated:
The jury system is, or in any event is intended to be, as I under-
stand it, a trial by your peers selected at random from all walks
of life. And I think it's wrong that a person should try and engi-
neer a better jury for himself, by exercising the right of
challenges. 132
Other barristers indicated that they trusted jurors to do their job
and that they believed that jurors, cognizant of the responsibility
placed upon them, would do their best to discard any personal
prejudice. Thus, the barristers stated, questioning jurors about
their biases or beliefs was not only a waste of time but "basically
improper."'3 3 These barristers' remarks indicate, then, an English
point-of-view that fairness is best achieved by a randomly-chosen
group of twelve people who try their best to impartially weigh the
evidence and come to a verdict.
B. Canada
Until recently, Canadian Crown prosecutors had both a right
to four peremptory challenges and a right to order forty-eight ju-
rors to standby,134 while criminal defense attorneys had a right to
twenty, twelve, or four peremptory challenges, depending on the
offense.135 Although the Law Reform Commission of Canada had
recommended twelve years earlier that Crown standbys be abol-
130. Generally speaking, a barrister is a lawyer who represents a client's case in litiga-
tion before a court of law. A solicitor is a lawyer who performs legal "office" or "desk"
work, such as drafting contracts. In England, a lawyer practices as either a barrister or a
solicitor, but not both. In Canada, a practicing lawyer may perform as either. The terms
barrister and solicitor aie not used in the United States. GERALD L. GALL, THE CANA-
DIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 188 (1990).
131. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 17, at 48.
132. Id. (citing Hans (1983), unpublished data).
133. Id. at 48-49.
134. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 634(1)(2) (1985) (Can.) (previously R.S.C., ch.
C-34, § 563(1)(2) (1970) (Can.)); see also supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
135. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 633 (1985) (Can.) (previously R.S.C., ch. C-34,
§ 562 (1970) (Can.)).
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ished and that both the prosecutor and the accused be accorded. the
same number of peremptory challenges, 136 these recommendations
were not enacted. On January 23, 1992, the Canadian Supreme
Court decision in Bain v. The Queen137 radically curtailed the jury
selection power of the Crown prosecutor and commanded the Ca-
nadian Parliament to rectify the imbalance between the Crown and
the accused. The values that motivated these changes are found in
both the Bain decision and the Parliamentary debates preceding
the subsequent legislation.
In Bain v. The Queen, in a 4-3 decision, the Canadian Supreme
Court held that Section 634(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code,
which allowed the Crown to stand-by forty-eight jurors, violated
Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.138
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevenson stated the essence of the
holding as follows:
Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
requires that an accused person receive a fair trial by an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal. However, to find a Charter
infringement, it is not necessary to find that juries are actually
partial. The informed observer's perception that the system of
selecting jurors impairs impartiality is sufficient.139
Thus, the Canada Supreme Court, in Bain v. The Queen, found the
value of the appearance of fairness to the public all important. 14°
The three dissenting justices in Bain argued that "[t]he stand-
aside 41 provisions of the Criminal Code [did] not infringe the right
to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal as guaran-
136. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, THE JURY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: WORK-
[NO PAPER 27, 53-55 (1980).
137. - S.C.R.- (1992), 87 D.L.R.4th 449 (1992).
138. Id. at 450. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982, has
been compared to the American Bill of Rights:
[Tihe drafters of the Charter either rejected or modified many of the elements
found in the American Bill of Rights. Significantly, the elements of the American
experience which were rejected or modified by Canadian drafters were those con-
stitutional provisions which required judges to vindicate particular substantive
values. Those features of the American constitution which required judges to
police the integrity of the political process were imported, largely unchanged, into
the Canadian Charter. Moreover, certain distinctively Canadian elements were
included in the Charter, these elements were directed towards protecting commu-
nitarian and democratic values.
PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER, FEDERALISM AND
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 99 (1987).
139. Bain, 87 D.L.R.4th at 450.
140. See infra part W.A.
141. "Stand-aside" is an alternative term for "standby."
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teed by § 11(d) of the Charter." 142 The dissenting justices reasoned
that:
While a jury should be impartial, representative, and competent,
the well-informed observer will know that mere random selec-
tion of jurors is not in and of itself a guarantee of a jury that
fosters these three qualities. A well-informed observer would
also be aware of the different roles of the accused and the
Crown in the jury selection process .... Nothing more is ex-
pected of the accused than trying to avoid conviction and pun-
ishment by asserting his rights according to law.... The Crown
Attorney, on the other hand, is not expected to seek conviction
above everything else. Crown counsel has special duties as a
public officer and plays a central role in the proper functioning
of the judicial system .... [T]he Crown prosecutor in the jury
selection process has a duty to ensure that the jury presents the
three characteristics of impartiality, representativeness and com-
petence.... The Criminal Code as it presently stands does not
sufficiently provide for other mechanisms to ensure impartiality,
representativeness or competence of jurors.... Accordingly, a
well-informed observer would not hold a reasonable apprehen-
sion of bias from the mere fact that there exists a disparity in the
number of recourses against jurors. Such an observer would see
in this disparity a reflection of the asymmetry between the role
of the accused, which is limited, going almost to self-preserva-
tion in nature, and the role of the Crown Attorney, who must
conscientiously discharge the quasi-judicial duties incumbent on
his public office and who, accordingly, requires some flexibility
in the means available to him. 143
This conflict between the Justices in Bain is reminiscent of the
conflict between the English Parliament in 1305 and the English
jurists of that time who originally created the Crown's use of the
standby.144 When the English Parliament in 1305 eliminated the
Crown's peremptory challenges, the value that Parliament's legisla-
tion intended to promote was "justice" in the form of diminishing
the absolute power of the Crown and increasing the power of the
defendant. This value was subverted by the English jurists' confi-
dence that a Crown prosecutor would never standby a juror with-
out a reasonable suspicion of prejudice. This same contest between
142. Bain, 87 D.L.R.4th at 451 (Gonthier, J., McLachlin and Tacobucci JJ. concurring,
dissenting).
143. 1d at 451-52.
144. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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confidence in the fairness of the prosecutor as an officer of the
court versus a suspicion of placing too much power in the prosecu-
tor as representative of the sovereign reoccurred in Bain almost
seven hundred years later. While a similar contest was present in
early United States Supreme Court decisions on peremptory chal-
lenges, 145 the conflict was resolved in Batson v. Kentucky. 146 The
most recent United States Supreme Court decision, Georgia v. Mc-
Collum, 147 has extended a limited duty of fairness as an officer of
the court to the criminal defense attorney.148
As a result of the decision in Bain, the Canadian Parliament
enacted legislation that repealed the Crown's use of the standby
and accorded the Crown prosecutor and the accused an equal
number of peremptory challenges. 149 These provisions were not
contested during the Parliamentary debates, although one member
of the House of Commons, Mr. Ian Waddell, suggested that the
provisions did not go far enough. The legislation became effective
on June 23, 1992.
The Parliamentary debates illuminate the values underlying
the enactment of the legislation. Speaking to the House of Com-
mons in favor of the proposed legislation, the Parliamentary Secre-
tary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Mr.
Rob Nicholson, stated that the legislation "would enhance the ap-
145. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
146. 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) ("The Constitution requires... that we... consider chal-
lenged selection practices to afford 'protection against action of the State through its ad-
ministrative officers in effecting the prohibited discrimination.'"). Cf Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965):
In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a
pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold
that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the
exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular
case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair
and impartial jury to try the case before the court.
Id. at 222.
147. - U.S. - (1992), 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
148. See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 ("Defense counsel is limited to 'legitimate, law-
ful conduct,"' quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986). See also infra notes 183-
93 and accompanying text.
149. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (jury), 40-41 Eliz. II, ch. 41, §§ 634, 641
(1992) (Can.), reprinted in 15 C. Gaz. pt. III, Aug. 21, 1992, at 1065. The statute accords
both parties 20 peremptory challenges where the accused is charged with high treason or
first degree murder, 12 peremptory challenges where the accused is charged with any other
offense for which the accused may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding five
years, and 4 peremptory challenges where the accused is charged with any other offense.
Id. § 634.
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pearance of fairness in the jury selection process." 150 In espousing
the institution of the jury in general, Mr. Nicholson pointed to the
following values:
The jury provides the primary opportunity for many Canadians
to participate in our justice system and at first hand to see the
criminal justice system at work.... [J]ury selection provisions
[must] ... reinforce the confidence that Canadians have in a fair
and impartial criminal justice system.151
The embodiment of the values espoused above, public partici-
pation and public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system, is apparent in both the enacted legislation and the Bain
majority opinion. During the House of Commons debates, Mr. Ian
Waddell raised two additional value issues. First, Mr. Waddell sug-
gested that, because the Government enjoyed vast resources and
power far superior to the accused, the Crown should not be given
any challenges at all.152 Mr. Rob Nicholson, Parliamentary Secre-
tary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, coun-
tered this suggestion by asserting that abolishing the ability of the
Crown attorney to reject certain jurors would be going too far, as
the Crown represents the interests of the people of Canada.15 3 As
Mr. Waddell himself expected, his suggestion was not accepted.154
Inherent in both Mr. Waddell's suggestion and Mr. Nicholson's
statement, however, is the value of fairness to the parties in an ad-
versarial system, albeit, from different viewpoints. The difference
in the viewpoints is based on the extent to which one perceives
government as truly representative of the interests of the people.
The second value issue raised by Mr. Waddell was racial dis-
crimination in jury selection. Echoing American peremptory chal-
lenge jurisprudence, Mr. Waddell argued that the proposed
legislation did not go far enough in that it still allowed the parties
to exercise peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. 55
150. H.C. DEB., May 5, 1992, at 10,099.
151. Id.
152. Id at 10,102 (asserting that because the government makes the law, sets the pen-
alty for breaking the law, controls the police who apprehend those who break the law,
chooses the judges who sit in the court that is administered by the government, and brings
the charges against the accused, a truly equal system would accord challenges only to the
accused).
153. H.C. DEB., June 12, 1992, at 11,893.
154. H.C. DEB., May 5, 1992, at 10,103; H.C. DEB., June 12, 1992, at 11,893, 11,895.
155. H.C. DEB., June 12, 1992, at 11,895. Mr. Waddell pointed to cases in which ab-
original people and black people were totally excluded from juries by the use of peremp-
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Another Member of the House of Commons, Mr. David Kilgour,
supported Mr. Waddell's argument by stating that the proposed
legislation did not solve the central problem-"that juries do not
reflect the demographics . . . of the communities they should
represent."
5 6
The "representative" jury was espoused by Mr. Waddell and
Mr. Kilgour to promote the values of appearance of fairness to the
public as well as appearance of fairness to the parties. These same
values formed the basis of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision
in The Queen v. Pizzacalla.15 7 In Pizzacalla, the appellant, a bar-
ber, had been convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the
form of improper touching of three women employed in his shop.
During jury selection, the Crown prosecutor used twenty-three
standbys, twenty of which he frankly admitted were used to ex-
clude men from the jury. The Crown prosecutor put his position
clearly on the record before the trial judge:
This is a case involving sexual harassment in the workplace. In
my experience, I was of the view that I might encounter a man
or more than one man who felt that, somehow, a person in the
workplace has the right to fondle, touch, make passes at, or
otherwise touch people in the workplace.158
As a result the appellant was tried by a jury composed entirely of
women. On appeal, the Crown agreed that "the manner in which
Crown counsel exercised the right to stand aside jurors gave 'the
appearance that the prosecutor secured a favorable jury, rather
than simply an impartial one."'159 The Ontario Court of Appeal
granted a new trial based on the Crown prosecutor's frank admis-
sion and the Crown's concession, on appeal, of "partiality." The
Ontario Court of Appeal, however, pointedly stated in its opinion
that "we are not, of course, saying that a jury composed entirely of
women, or of men, cannot render an impartial verdict in a case
involving an accused person of the opposite sex." 16°
tory challenges. Id. at 11,896-98. He cited an inquiry which found that, throughout the
entire history of the province of Nova Scotia, no aboriginal person had ever been on a jury,
and a different inquiry that had recommended that peremptory challenges and standbys be
eliminated and only challenges for cause be allowed. Id at 11,896.
156. Id. at 11,898.
157. No. 25/89, 1991 Ont. C.A. LEXIS 324 (Nov. 15, 1991).
158. Id. at 2.
159. Id at 3 (citations omitted).
160. Id.
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Thus, while the Bain decision makes clear that the appearance
of fairness is an important value in the Canadian regulation of per-
emptory challenges, as yet, non-representative juries are not per se
unfair. Additionally, as the statements of Mr. Waddell and Mr.
Kilgour during the Parliamentary debates indicate, Canada shares
with the United States problems of racially discriminatory jury se-
lection and juries that fail to represent the demographic character-
istics of the communities they represent. Nonetheless, Parliament
has thus far declined to take action on these issues and the Cana-
dian Supreme Court has not addressed them.
C. The United States
The 1992 United States. Supreme Court decision, Georgia v.
McCollum, 161 provides the most useful vehicle to understand the
development of peremptory challenge regulation in the United
States. Not only is Georgia v. McCollum the most current thinking
to date of the United States Supreme Court on the subject, but the
decision also reveals an evaluation and prioritization of the values
underlying the American jury system. As the line of United States
Supreme Court decisions preceding Georgia v. McCollum has been
well-documented, only a brief overview is provided here.
Strauder v. West Virginia:1 62 The Court held invalid a West Vir-
ginia statute which provided that only white men could serve on
juries. The Court held further that, although defendants have no
right to a petit jury composed of members of their own race, de-
fendants do have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are
selected by nondiscriminatory criteria. 163
Swain v. Alabama:1 64 The Court found that the use of per-
emptory challenges over a period of time to systematically remove
prospective African-American jurors in criminal trials of African-
American defendants might violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.165
Batson v. Kentucky: 66 The Court held that a defendant who is
a member of a racially cognizable group may establish a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution in his own trial.
161. - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
162. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
163. Id. at 305, 310.
164. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
165. Id at 223-24.
166. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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The defendant must show that the prosecution is using peremptory
challenges to eliminate jurors of his own race. Once this is shown,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that the jurors were
struck for neutral reasons. If the prosecution fails to carry this bur-
den, the violation is established and the exercise of that specific
peremptory challenge is prohibited.
167
Powers v. Ohio:168 The Court held that a criminal defendant
may object to the race-based exercise of peremptory challenges by
the prosecutor whether or not the defendant and excluded juror
are of the same race.1
69
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.:170 The Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution prohibits civil liti-
gants from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discrimi-
natory manner.' 71
Georgia v. McCollum:172 The Court held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant
from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner.173
In Georgia v. McCollum, three defendants, all white, had been
charged with beating and assaulting two African-Americans. 174
Before the jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit
the defense from exercising its peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner. 75 The prosecution asserted that if a statis-
tically representative panel was assembled for jury selection, eight-
een of the potential forty-two jurors would be African-American,
and that because the defense was allowed twenty peremptory chal-
lenges, the defense would be able to remove all African-American
jurors from the jury. 176 The trial court denied the motion, holding
that "'[n]either Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defend-
ants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory
manner.'"177 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
178
167. Id. at 95-97.
168. 499 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
169. Id at 1366.
170. 500 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
171. Id at 2087.
172. - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
173. Id. at 2359.
174. Id. at 2351.
175. Id
176. Georgia v. McCollum, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2351 (1992).
177. Id. at 2352.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court de-
cision.179 The majority opinion addressed four issues, three of
which explore values pertinent to this Comment: (1) whether a
criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed in Batson; (2)
whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal de-
fendant constitutes state action; and (3) whether the constitutional
rights of a criminal defendant nonetheless preclude the extension
of Batson and its prodigy to the exercise of peremptory challenges
by a criminal defendant.180
In addressing the first concern, whether a criminal defendant's
exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory man-
ner inflicts the harms addressed in Batson, the Court identified
these harms as (1) the indignity suffered by the potential juror by
being subjected to open and public racial discrimination, and (2)
the undermining of public confidence in the integrity of the crimi-
nal justice system.181 The majority opinion found that these harms
are directly related; namely, the former gives rise to the latter.
"ITIhe harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond
that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch
the entire community.". . . Selection procedures that purpose-
fully exclude African-Americans from juries undermine ... pub-
lic confidene ..... "The overt wrong, often apparent to the
entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties,
the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout
the trial of the cause.' '
Thus, the Court answered affirmatively that a criminal defendant's
exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory man-
ner does inflict the harms addressed in Batson. By finding a causal
relationship between open racial discrimination against a potential
juror and the undermining of public confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system, the United States Supreme Court in McCollum, like
the Canadian Supreme Court in Bain, underlined the importance
of the public appearance of fairness within a criminal justice
system.
178. Id
179. 1d at 2359.
180. Georgia v. McCollum, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (1992).
181. Id. at 2353-54.
182. Id at 2353 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986), and Powers v.
Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1991)) (citations omitted).
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The next question addressed by the Court in McCollum was
whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal de-
fendant constitutes state action. 8 3 There is no direct analogy to
this issue in the English and Canadian systems of peremptory chal-
lenge regulation. England chose to abolish peremptory challenges
largely because enough members of Parliament believed that de-
fendants utilized them to obtain favorable verdicts.'84 Further-
more, the concept of the criminal defendant as a "state actor" is
foreign to English jurisprudence. 85 The Canadian Supreme Court
in Bain never addressed state action because the right impinged in
Bain-the right of an accused person to receive a fair trial by an
independent and impartial tribunal-is not framed in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a prohibition against state ac-
tion.186 The United States Supreme Court prohibition on the use
of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, how-
ever, is based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The language of
the Equal Protection Clause provides that "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
183. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354.
184. See supra notes 97-99, 103-05, 113 and accompanying text.
185. The following excerpt from the Parliamentary floor debates on the abolition of
the peremptory challenge in England is illustrative.
Mr. Mark Carlisle: So long as the right of peremptory challenge exists, it is the
responsibility and duty of defence counsel, if they consider that it is in their cli-
ent's interest, to use it....
Mr. Budgen: One of the mysteries of this system is that all of us have used the
right of peremptory challenge to try to rig juries in our favour but, more often
than not, it does not work that way....
Mr. Carlisle: The delight of my hon. Friend is the honesty of the language that he
uses. As he said, he has attempted to use the peremptory challenge to rig juries in
favour of those whom he has represented.
Mr. Lawrence: It would not be an abuse.
Mr. Carlisle: It would not be an abuse. It is the duty of defence counsel, so long
as that power exists, to use it in what he believes are in the interests of his client.
113 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 981-82 (1987).
186. Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads: "Any per-
son charged with an offence has the right (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal."
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
§ 11(d). While the Canadian Supreme Court in Bain based its decision solely on Section
11(d) of the Charter, Sections 15 and 28 of the Charter provide for equal protection and
equal benefit of the law and equality before and under the law, regardless of race, national
or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. Id. at §§ 15, 28.
These Sections are also not framed in terms of state action, but, as yet, they have not been
used to regulate the use of peremptory challenges.
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laws . . ."187 Thus, in McCollum, before the criminal defendant
could be prohibited from using peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner, the United States Supreme Court had to
find that the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal de-
fendant constituted state action.
One year prior to its decision in McCollum, the United States
Supreme Court, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,188 found
that the exercise of peremptory challenges by civil litigants consti-
tuted state action.189 The majority in McCollum built upon the Ed-
monson decision, finding as follows:
The exercise of a peremptory challenge differs significantly from
other actions taken in support of a defendant's defense. In exer-
cising a peremptory challenge, a criminal defendant is wielding
the power to choose a quintessential governmental body ....
[W]hen "a government confers on a private body the power to
choose the government's employees or officials, the private
body will be bound by the constitutional mandate of race
neutrality."19o
While the Court acknowledged that criminal defendants exercise
peremptory challenges to increase their chances of acquittal, it
found that this personal motive did not conflict with a finding of
state action.191
The Court's finding of state action in McCollum was criticized
by four out of the nine Justices. Justice O'Connor, who dissented
in Edmonson as well as in McCollum, argued that the unique and
clearly antagonistic relationship between the government and a
criminal defendant precludes any finding of state action on the part
of the criminal defendant.192 In contrast, nothing in the jurispru-
dence of either England or Canada indicates any predilection to-
wards designating any actions of a criminal defendant as that of a
state actor. This designation is a uniquely American designation,
one that was required by the language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution if the Court was to achieve
the resulting decision. As will be explained below, the designation
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
188. 500 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
189. Id. at 2086.
190. Georgia v. McCollum, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (1992) (citation omitted)
(quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (1991)).
191. Id. at 2356-57.
192. Id. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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of a criminal defendant as a state actor for the purpose of exercis-
ing peremptory challenges was propelled by an underlying hierar-
chy of values.193
The Court in McCollum addressed this hierarchy of values in
considering the final issue of the case: whether the rights of a crimi-
nal defendant nonetheless precluded the extension of Edmonson
to the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defend-
ant.194 The Court first noted that "peremptory challenges are not
constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but
one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial
jury and a fair trial."'195 Second, the Court noted that it had "recog-
nized that 'the role of litigants in determining the jury's composi-
tion provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system
and of its verdicts.' 196 The Court, however, finally concluded that
"if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel
as fair," we affirm today that such a "price is too high to meet
the standard of the Constitution".... [I]t is an affront to justice
to argue that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against
a group of citizens based upon their race.197
Whether the phrase "acceptance of a jury panel as fair" ap-
plies to the public's acceptance or the defendant's acceptance is
ambiguous. 198 These are, of course, two very different perceptions
and values. Nonetheless, given the language of the Court when it
initially discussed the harms identified in Batson, i.e., the under-
mining of public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice
system, 199 it is logical to assume that the Court is speaking of the
193. Whether this hierarchy of values was already present due to the Court's decision
in Batson or whether the Court in McCollum decided to place one value above another is
irrelevant to this Comment.
194. Id. at 2357-58. If Edmonson was extended to criminal defendants, criminal de-
fendants would be bound by Batson in their exercise of peremptory challenges, and would
be required to show a neutral reason guiding the exercise of peremptory challenges in what
appeared to be a racially discriminatory way.
195. Georgia v. McCollum, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992).
196. Id. (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088).
197. Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
198. The original textual context in Edmonson, while still ambiguous, is as follows:
It may be true that the role of litigants in determining the jury's composition
provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system and its verdicts. But if
race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is
too high to meet the standard of the Constitution. Other means exist for litigants
to satisfy themselves of a juror's impartiality without using skin color as a test.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
199. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353-54.
236 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 16:201
defendant's "acceptance of a jury panel as fair."2m The Court thus
elevates the value of the appearance of fairness to the public above
the value initially espoused by Blackstone, that a defendant have a
good opinion of his jury.20 1
The United States Supreme Court, then, engaged in a balanc-
ing test and ranked the value of the appearance of fairness to the
public above the value of the appearance of fairness to the defend-
ant.2 2 To achieve this result, the Court stretched, on a disputable
basis, the state action requirement of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 3 The Court's willingness to
stretch the Equal Protection Clause to further the value of the ap-
pearance of fairness to the public clearly indicates the hierarchy of
values in the American jury system and peremptory challenge
regulation.
200. Id. at 2358 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088
(1991)).
201. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
202. Justice Scalia characterized this balancing as "promoting the supposedly greater
good of race relations in the society as a whole (make no mistake that this is what underlies
all of this)," over "the ages-old right of criminal defendants to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they consider fair." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2365
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas characterized this balancing as "exalt[ing] the right
of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the
defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death." Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). These characterizations accord no credence to the majority opinion's discus-
sion that the exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner under-
mines public confidence in the criminal justice system. See id. at 2353-54 (discussing the
likelihood of undermining public confidence).
203. As Justice O'Connor stated in McCollum:
From arrest, to trial, to possible sentencing and punishment, the antagonistic rela-
tionship between government and the accused is clear for all to see. Rather than
squarely facing this fact, the Court, as in Edmonson, rests its finding of govern-
mental action on the points that defendants exercise peremptory challenges in a
courtroom and judges alter the composition of the jury in response to defendants'
choices .... Dodson makes clear that the unique relationship between criminal
defendants and the State precludes attributing defendants' actions to the State,
whatever is the case in civil trials.
Id. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Cf. H.C. DEB., (Can.), May 5, 1992, at 10,102 (state-
ment of Mr. Ian Waddell). During a debate on a new bill regulating peremptory challenges
in Canada after the Bain decision, Mr. Waddell suggested that the Crown not be given any
challenges at all. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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IV. COMPARISON OF VALUES SERVED BY PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE REGULATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The use of the peremptory challenge in selecting a jury was
designed, from its inception, to serve certain values. Court opin-
ions, statutes, floor debates of legislative bodies, scholarly writings,
and history are the sources that define these values. Developing
case law as well as legislation reveal that these values are not static,
but have changed or at least shifted in their hierarchy, since per-
emptory challenges were first used.2o4 This Comment uses six val-
ues to compare peremptory challenge regulation in the United
States, England, and Canada: (1) the appearance of fairness to the
public; (2) public participation in the criminal justice system; (3)
the rights of the individual juror; (4) the appearance of fairness to
the accused; (5) the need to get convictions; and (6) efficiency and
cost.
A. Appearance of Fairness to the Public
The public appearance of fairness and the resulting public con-
fidence in the criminal justice system have emerged as the para-
mount value in peremptory challenge regulation in both the United
States and Canada.2°5 The preeminence of this value has pro-
duced, thus far, different results in peremptory challenge regula-
tion in the two countries. In Canada, the accused and the Crown
have been accorded an equal number of peremptory challenges.2°6
In the United States, neither the prosecution nor the defense may
exercise peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner.2o7
Public appearance of fairness is also an important, if not para-
mount, value in peremptory challenge regulation in England. The
abolition of the peremptory challenge in England was based, in
part, on the belief that random selection of jurors yields the highest
appearance of fairness to the public.2°8 Nonetheless, the repeated
references to crime-control concerns by b6th the Government and
its supporters in Parliament suggest that the need to get convic-
204. These changes have, of course, been criticized. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing destruction of an "ages-old right").
205. See supra notes 139-40, 198-202 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
207. See supra part III.C.
208. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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tions was likely of superior importance to the value of public ap-
pearance of fairness.2°9 Of course, when crime incidences soar,
higher conviction rates can be interpreted by the public as an ap-
pearance of "fairness." The English Government almost certainly
had this in mind when it proposed the abolition of the peremptory
challenge.
In contrast, Canadian and American case law gives no indica-
tion that the need for convictions is a basis of peremptory chal-
lenge regulation in these countries. Canadian and American case
law is focused on the appearance of fairness in the process, not the
result.210 Thus, the preeminent value basis for peremptory chal-
lenge regulation in the United States and Canada appears to be
different from that in England. Accordingly, because of this differ-
ing value basis, the United States should find the values supporting
the abolition of peremptory challenges in England ill-suited to the
goals that the United States seeks to accomplish by its regulation of
the peremptory challenge.
The preeminence of the value of public appearance of fairness
comes, however, at a price. While American prohibition on the
exercise of race-based peremptory challenges may promote the
value of the public appearance of fairness in the courtroom, this
measure is ineffective. If allowing the prosecution or the defense
to exercise a peremptory challenge on the basis of race undermines
public confidence in the criminal justice system, it follows that al-
lowing them to exercise a peremptory challenge on the basis of
gender, ethnic background, age, class, or appearance is equally
damaging. Thus, the surviving grounds upon which a peremptory
challenge can be exercised is on some inarticulable "hunch" of ju-
ror impartiality that does not amount to the level of challenge for
cause and that is not based on race, gender, ethnic background,
age, class, or appearance. 211 Given this prospect, the randomly-se-
209. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 141-42, 203-05 and accompanying text.
211. See HAsTm, supra note 7, at 149 ("[Ihe relationship is weak between the back-
ground characteristics of jurors, such as demography, personality, and general attitudes,
and their verdict preferences in typical felony cases. However, the jurors' world knowl-
edge concerning events and individuals involved in the facts of the case does effect their
verdict decisions."). Thus, an attorney could develop a reliable "hunch," based purely on a
potential juror's world knowledge, that would not amount to a challenge for cause on the
basis of impartiality, nor be based on immutable characteristics such as race, gender, ethnic
background, etc. It is this kind of "hunch" that conceivably could form a legitimate basis
for a "neutral reason" peremptory challenge.
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lected jury would appear to become increasingly more attractive,
even though the underlying values for its American adoption differ
from those espoused by the English. The randomly-selected jury,
however, negates the value of the original underlying purpose of
the peremptory challenge, namely, Blackstone's idea that a defend-
ant should feel good about his jury so that its verdict is more ac-
ceptable to him.
Nevertheless, as the Parliamentary debates in both England
and Canada reveal, peremptory challenges cannot remedy a jury
venire that fails to represent a cross-section of the community in
which the crime was committed. If, as the English believe, ran-
domly-selected juries provide the fairest form of trial by jury, then
the random selection must be made from a venire representative of
the community in which the offense was committed. Public ap-
pearance of fairness would depend on whether such representation
is actually achieved. 212
B. Public Participation in the Criminal Justice System
All three countries acknowledge the value of public participa-
tion in the adjudication of public offenses. In the United States,
however, this value is accorded more importance, as evidenced by
the greater number of jury trials and the greater control accorded
to juries in sentencing. Historically, Americans, more than the
English or Canadians, have mistrusted the power of the sovereign.
As a hedge against this po-er, Americans have, instead, trusted
juries to ascertain and enforce justice. As long as this value retains
a high level of importance in the United States, extensive voir dire
and regulated peremptory challenges also have value. After all,
when greater control is entrusted to the jury, greater care in its
selection is appropriate. Thus, peremptory challenges that are
based on the potential juror's world knowledge and life experience
may be necessary.
212. Through the media, the public knows immediately the race and/or ethnic back-
grounds of jurors, and sometimes their occupations. Based on this information, the public
makes judgments as to whether the composition of a jury fairly reflects the composition of
the community in which the crime took place. If too great a disparity exists between the
perceived composition of a jury and the perceived composition of the community, many
members of the populace will believe that the composition of the jury unfairly affected the
verdict, and the public appearance of fairness diminishes. See generally Laurie L. Leven-
son, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 So. CAL. L. REv. 1533 (1993).
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C. Rights of the Individual Juror
In all three countries, no one has a vested "right" to be a juror
in a specific trial. Peremptory challenge regulation in both Eng-
land and the United States does, however, seek to protect the indi-
vidual juror from embarrassment and humiliation. In particular,
the United States acknowledges the right of the individual juror to
be shielded from the public stigma of racial discrimination.
In England, prior to the elimination of peremptory challenges,
it was argued that peremptory challenges saved individual jurors
from embarrassment. If peremptories were eliminated, trial law-
yers would make more challenges for cause and judges would be
required to rule on alleged juror bias much more often.213 The ba-
sis for the challenge for cause must be stated in open court for the
record.214 If the judge rules that the juror is unfit to sit in judgment
on the case, the judge discounts the juror's claim of impartiality or,
putting it more bluntly, declares the juror to be at least mistaken if
not a liar.215 The dismissed juror may feel embarrassed, humili-
ated, and even resentful of the legal system in general.216
The value of appearance of fairness to the public, however, in
all three countries, is superior to the value of the right of the poten-
tial juror to be shielded from embarrassment not based on an im-
mutable characteristic.21 7 Thus, the argument in favor of retaining
peremptory challenges to shield potential jurors from embarrass-
ment due to dismissal for cause cannot prevail if peremptory chal-
lenges appear unfair to the public. In the United States, however,
the right of a juror not to be excluded from a jury based on race is
entwined with the public appearance of fairness.
To better safeguard the right of a juror not to be embarrassed
in open court, challenges for cause should be made in camera or, at
least, outside the presence of the jury. If peremptory challenges
are progressively restricted, it is likely that challenges for cause will
increase. Americans, like the English, value highly the individual
juror's dignity. A challenge for cause made in camera would pro-
tect the privacy of the individual juror. On the other hand, the
public would be denied any opportunity to assess the fairness of




217. But see Justice Thomas' concurrence in Georgia v. McCollum, - U.S. -, 112 S.
Ct. 2348, 2353-54 (1992).
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the process. For this reason, given the preeminence of the value of
public appearance of fairness, challenges for cause should be made
in the courtroom while the jury is absent. In this way, the individ-
ual juror is spared embarrassment, and, if the challenge for cause is
denied, the juror need never know it was made and thus has no
basis to resent the party making it.218
D. Appearance of Fairness to the Accused
Despite the legacy of Blackstone, none of the three countries
rank this value as supreme. England negated this value completely
when it abolished the peremptory challenge. In his final argument
before Parliament, the Home Secretary stated, "[Tihe Govern-
ment's case is that peremptory challenge is not effective in creating
a jury which reflects the defendant's world. '219 In England, the
accused must depend upon the "random selection" of the jurors
and the challenge for cause to feel that the system has "done right
by him."
Canada seems to rank this value higher than either England or
the United States. The Canadian Supreme Court, in Bain v. The
Queen, held that the peremptory challenges accorded the prosecu-
tion and the defense must be equalized. Additionally, Canada has
yet to restrict how peremptory challenges are exercised, so long as
the prosecution never admits to attempting to control the composi-
tion of the jury.
While the United States Supreme Court continues to give lip
service to this value, given the primacy of the value of public ap-
pearance of fairness, value of the appearance of fairness to the ac-
cused seems destined to lose importance in the American criminal
justice system. The ability to remove a potential juror for no rea-
son other than a hunch that he will ultimately vote against the de-
fendant seems diametrically opposed to the public appearance of
fairness. Unless a case can be made that the American public rec-
ognizes a "fairness" value in allowing the defendant to remove
from the jury a certain number of potential jurors so that the de-
fendant feels good about his fact-finders, verdict-deciders, and, in
some cases, sentencers, it appears that in the United States, ap-
218. See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 227 (proposing challenge for cause be made outside
presence of jury).
219. 113 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 972, 998 (1986).
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pearance of public fairness ultimately trumps the appearance of
fairness to the accused. 220
If, however, the peremptory challenge, even in its restricted
form, functions to insure that the defendant is tried by a jury capa-
ble of understanding him, then the peremptory challenge promotes
the public appearance of fairness as well as the appearance of fair-
ness to the accused in a way that a randomly-selected jury cannot.
There are, in the United States, citizens, and perhaps even some
communities as a whole, who feel that the American criminal jus-
tice system "tilts" against minorities and, in particular, the minority
defendant. 221 These members of the American populace may feel
that the appearance of fairness to the defendant is a value deserv-
ing of greater importance. In any event, while this value is still
alive in the United States, it has been diminished in recent
Supreme Court decisions.
To reflect the current hierarchy of values in the United States,
the number of peremptory challenges accorded both the prosecu-
tion and the defense should be reduced. By reducing the number
of peremptory challenges, the parties will be less capable of dra-
matically altering the composition of an entire jury, thus enhancing
the public appearance of fairness.2m2 The defendant, nonetheless,
will still retain the sense that he is able to remove at least some
jurors incapable of understanding his side of the case. The legisla-
ture should reduce the exact number of peremptory challenges
gradually and study the effects of each reduction to determine the
optimum number of peremptory challenges to be accorded each
side.
E. Getting Convictions
The value of getting convictions at the hands of a jury appears
to have driven England's abolition of the peremptory challenge.
Mention of this value is absent from peremptory challenge regula-
tion in Canada and the United States. While at least one American
220. See Bray, supra note 4, at 560 (arguing that by expanding the challenge for cause,
prospective juror partiality will be uncovered, allowing defendants to feel good about their
juries).
221. Rosen, supra note 4.
222. See Van Dyke, Peremptory Challenges Revisited, supra note 70, at 133 (written
prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. McCollum, arguing that
the number of peremptory challenges should be reduced, but that the defendant should be
accorded more than the prosecution).
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commentator has argued that defense-oriented, or anti-crime con-
trol, juries exist in America, as yet, this value has had no influence
on peremptory challenge regulation in the United States.
The English reason for abolition of peremptory challenges,
namely, crime control, is insufficient to support the abolition of
peremptory challenges in the United States. While a legislature
may enact harsher penalties for crime and a city council may vote
to hire more law enforcement personnel, few Americans believe
that jury composition is related to high crime rates. In fact, except
for when the composition of a jury fails to accurately represent a
cross-section of the community injured by the crime, most Ameri-
cans believe in the effectiveness of juries.
Americans, as a whole, do believe that there is too much vio-
lent crime, especially in urban areas, and that society and victims as
well as defendants have rights in the adjudication of crime. To best
serve these beliefs, the Canadian system which gives an equal
number of peremptory challenges to both the defense and the
prosecution, should be adopted throughout the United States.
F. Efficiency/Cost
Certainly, no country exists where the values of efficiency and
cost are unimportant. The issue is prioritization of this value. Both
England and Canada are extremely wary of the inefficiency and
expense of jury selection in the United States.m Perhaps for this
reason, jury trials are much less common in either of these two
countries than in the United States. In any case, although the
United States is increasingly more concerned about the cost and
inefficiency of its criminal justice system, at present, this value is
given a higher priority in England and Canada than in the United
States.
V. CONCLUSION
One commentator has proposed a plan for the revision of per-
emptory challenges that appears to accommodate both the value of
223. 106 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 504-05 (1986).
Mr. Lawrence: I am sure that the road down which the United States has
progressed is specifically one that would not be attractive to this or any other
Government. The spectacle in a United States court of juries being challenged
for one, two, or three days, to process a trial that takes half a day or a day, is
preposterous. Apart from that, it is extremely expensive and very demanding on
the time of the jurymen .... Therefore, the example of the United States is partic-
ularly bad and should be held up as a dreadful warning to all of us here.
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public appearance of fairness and the value of the appearance of
fairness to the accused.224 Under this plan, after voir dire and after
exercising their challenges for cause, both prosecution and defense
would submit to the court a list of preferred jurors, ranking them in
order of preference. The number of names on each list would cor-
respond to the number of jurors on a petit jury in that jurisdiction.
Regardless of the order of preference, the court would place on the
jury those persons whose name appeared on both lists, as the ap-
pearance of those persons' names on both lists indicates that both
the prosecution and the defense accept those persons as impartial
jurors. The jurors whose names appeared on only one list would
then be subject to removal by a party if, to the court's satisfaction,
the removing party provided a neutral reason justifying the re-
moval. The court would alternate between the prosecution and de-
fense in considering these challenges, and the number of successful
strikes available to each side would be determined by law, just as
the number of peremptory challenges is currently determined by
law. After both sides exhausted these "neutral reason" strikes, the
court would randomly select among the remaining persons the
number needed to complete the jury.
Coupled with the other recommendations in this Comment,
this system would provide a fair means to select a jury that the
defendant feels is capable of understanding him. Under this sys-
tem, the value of the public appearance of fairness and the value of
the appearance of fairness to the accused could be reconciled and
accommodated in a way not possible under a system of purely ran-
dom selection. While not retaining the peremptory challenge in its
historical form, this system would inculcate the values historically
promoted by the peremptory challenge as well as the values
deemed most important in current American peremptory challenge
jurisprudence.
Judith Heinz*
224. Harris, supra note 4, at 1062-63.
* The author thanks Professor Laurie L. Levenson for her inspirational example,
namely, her dedication to teaching her students and her community to work for justice in
our criminal law system. Without this example and her support, my law school experience
would have been considerably less meaningful and successful.
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